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ABSTRACT
In 2013, the Supreme Court in Myriad held that DNA is a “product of nature” that is not patentable
merely because it is isolated from the human body. The year before, the Supreme Court in
Prometheus held that diagnostic tests that incorporate little more than a “law of nature” is not
patent eligible. These two decisions altered the landscape of patent eligible subject matter under
Section 101 of the patent statute. They not only impact the patent eligibility of isolated DNA or
diagnostic tests, but they may also have far wider-ranging impact on other technological fields,
including biotechnology and nanotechnology. This article delves into the history of cases leading up
to these two decisions as a way to determine the exact scope of the decisions. In particular, the
article looks at the parallel development of the “product of nature” and “law of nature” doctrines, and
examines its culmination in Myriad and Prometheus. The article then looks at whether and to what
extent the patentability of nanotechnology will be impacted. Nanotechnology is “the science of
manipulating materials on an atomic or molecular scale.” By its very nature, nanotechnology
incorporates products of nature and laws of nature. But the technology also creates new benefits and
uses that may deserve patent protection. This article looks at both the current state of the law and
policy reasons that must be considered in determining the patent eligibility of inventions in the field
of nanotechnology.
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WILL NANOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS BE IMPACTED BY THE FEDERAL
COURTS’ “PRODUCT OF NATURE” EXCEPTION TO SUBJECT-MATTER
ELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. 101?
LAURA W. SMALLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nanotechnology literally means “the science of manipulating materials on an
atomic or molecular scale.”1 While what constitutes “nanotechnology” varies
depending on the context, the United States National Nanotechnology Initiative
defines the field as “science, engineering, and technology conducted at the nanoscale,
which is about 1 to 100 nanometers.”2 The United States Patent and Trademark
Office’s (“USPTO”) definition of nanotechnology-related patents (those involving
“nanostructure”) conforms to that of the National Nanotechnology Initiative’s,3 as
does the definition of nanotechnology used by many foreign patent offices. 4
This article looks at whether nanotechnology is patent-eligible. The current
Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter as any “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof . . . .”5 While the courts have interpreted the Patent Act’s definition of subject
matter broadly, the Supreme Court has created certain categories of patent-ineligible
subject matter, including laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.6
These judicially created categories of patent-ineligible subject matter ostensibly were

* © Laura W. Smalley 2014. Ms. Smalley is a member of the firm Harris Beach PLLC. She
practices in the Business and Commercial Litigation, Intellectual Property, and Appellate Litigation
and Advocacy Practice Groups, and serves on the Nanotechnology Industry Team. She can be
contacted at lsmalley@harrisbeach.com.
1 Nanotechnology Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/nanotechnology (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
2 What
is
Nanotechnology?,
NATIONAL
NANOTECHNOLOGY
INITIATIVE,
http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/definition (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
3 Nanotechnology
Class
Definition,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc977/defs977.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2013)
(defining a “nanostructure” as “an atomic, molecular, or macromolecular structure” that has “at
least one physical dimension of approximately 1-100 nanometers” and possesses “a special property,
provides a special function, or produces a special effect that is uniquely attributable to the
structure[’]s nanoscale physical size”).
4 See Patenting Nanotechnology: Exploring the Challenges, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (Apr. 2011), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2011/02/article_0009.html#7.
5 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
6 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
(“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”).
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created to prohibit patent claims from preempting broad principles such as physical
laws (E = mc2) or other manifestations of nature.7
Recent Supreme Court decisions and other scholarship have addressed whether
medical diagnostic methods are patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the
Patent Act or whether they are unpatentable “laws of nature.”8 These cases elucidate
principles that are helpful to understanding how the courts will treat nanotechnology
inventions, particularly as to how the courts will apply the “natural law” exception to
Section 101. The recent Supreme Court decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. addressed the “law of nature” exception, holding that
the correlation between blood metabolite levels and drug dosage was a law of nature,
and that the additional steps purporting to apply that law failed to transform it into
patent-eligible subject matter.9 According to the Supreme Court, additional steps
that “involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by
researchers in the field,” cannot transform a law of nature into patent-eligible subject
matter.10
After Prometheus, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided Association for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.11 The court held that
isolated DNA is patentable and that the rationale of Prometheus does not control a
claim to a composition of matter.12 The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in
Myriad reversed the Federal Circuit in part, holding that naturally occurring DNA
segments are not patentable.13 In determining the subject matter eligibility of DNA
and complementary DNA (“cDNA”), the Supreme Court based its decision on whether
the patentee “create[d]” a “new . . . composition of matter.”14 It did not overtly rely on
Prometheus’ “inventive concept” analysis, although the Court noted that “separating
[a] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.” 15 The
Court held that cDNA was patent eligible because the cDNA molecule is not
“naturally occurring.”16 It did not address whether, once the natural genetic
sequence was known, creating cDNA required an “inventive concept.”17 It remains to
be seen whether an “inventive concept” is required for a composition of matter to be
patent eligible, or whether obviousness, rather than § 101, will control the inquiry on
whether nature-based products are patentable.
The rules articulated in Prometheus and Myriad may ultimately be applicable
to nanotechnology.
Compositions of matter that fall into the category of
nanotechnology may already exist in nature or be a small-scale version of something
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
See infra Part III.
9 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012).
10 Id. at 1294.
11 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Myriad III), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (mem.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 133
S.Ct. 2107 (2013).
12 Id. at 1309, 1339–40.
13 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2117, 2120 (2013).
14 Id. at 2109–10.
15 Id. at 2117–18.
16 Id. at 2119.
17 Id.
7
8
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that already exists in nature. For example, carbon nanotubes are naturally created
in soot, but are the subject of thousands of patents. 18 Further, the usefulness of
nanotechnology inventions often comes from the unique properties of matter at the
nanoscale, such as increased magnetism, conductivity, reactivity, or reflective
ability.19 The “product of nature” doctrine, as articulated in Prometheus and Myriad,
may have substantial effects on the patenting of nanotechnology-related inventions
because many such inventions involve discovering and harnessing the properties of
material at the nanoscale or processes involving the use of nanoscale materials. This
article explores the implication of recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent on nanotechnology.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE PRODUCT OF NATURE DOCTRINE
The “product of nature” doctrine is one aspect of a judicially created doctrine
excluding certain subject matter, such as mental processes and abstract ideas, from
the broad statutory definition of patent-eligible subject matter.20 The exclusion of
that subject matter is not constitutionally required. The Intellectual Property Clause
of the United States Constitution permits Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” by granting “to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”21 Given that “discover” means “to be the
first to find or find out about; to learn about or encounter for the first time; to find
after study or search; to reveal or make known,”22 the use of the term “Discoveries”
does not foreclose protection for products of nature.23
Likewise, the “product of nature” doctrine itself is not mandated by the language
of the Patent Act, neither presently nor for most of the existence of the patent system
of the United States. Under Section 1 of the 1790 Patent Act, a patent could be
granted to an inventor who had “invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein.” 24 While the Patent Act of

18 Julie A. Burger et al., Nanotechnology and the Intellectual Property Landscape, in
NANOSCALE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE NANO CENTURY 239, 245 (Nigel M. de S. Cameron
& M. Ellen Mitchell eds. 2007).
19 What
It Is and How It Works, NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE,
http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
20 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 Discover
Definition,
COLLINS
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
available
at
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/discover (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
23 See John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1274 (2011)
(noting that the three judicially created exceptions to patent-eligibility are not required in the text of
35 U.S.C. § 101).
24 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, 109, § 1 (Apr. 10, 1790) (emphasis added).
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1793 eliminated the reference to discoveries,25 the 1836 Patent Act again included
the term “discovery” in the definition of patentable subject matter.26
The basic definition of patentable subject matter was not amended again until
1952, when 35 U.S.C. § 101 was promulgated along with separate statutory
requirements for novelty and non-obviousness (which were already requirements
under existing case law).27 The 1952 Patent Act (“Patent Act”) defines the term
“invention” as “invention or discovery,” and states that a patent may be granted to a
person who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”28 Again,
the term “discovery” connotes material that is already in existence and simply found,
not created. The judicial creation of a “product of nature” exception is not necessarily
based on the language of the Patent Act or the Constitution, but based on policy
considerations noted by the judiciary.29
Congress’ use of expansive terms in describing patent-eligible subject matter,
modified by the comprehensive term “any,” plainly contemplates that the patent laws
“would be given wide scope.”30 The Act’s broad language notwithstanding, courts
have long recognized a limitation that patents cannot issue for “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”31
A. Early Decisions Based on Lack of Novelty.
The theory behind the “product of nature” exception was first addressed in terms
of novelty, rather than as an exclusion from patentable subject matter. This
25 Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318, 318, § 1 (Feb. 21, 1793) (providing that a patent may be
granted to one who “invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, not known or used before the application”).
26 See Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, 119, § 6 (July 4, 1836) (“[H]aving discovered or invented
any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used by
others before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the time of his application for a
patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent or allowance, as the inventor or discoverer.”).
27 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2105 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP].
28 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
29 In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal Circuit, Court of Appeals
confirmed that the Plant Patent Act does not protect a “discovery” per se. Id. The term “discovery,”
as used in the legislative history and the Act, referred to the “discovery” resulting from the plant
breeder’s own work and not a “chance find” or discovery. Id. While the Plant Patent Act was
amended in 1954 to provide protection for “newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated
plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state,” it was limited to seedlings found on land in a
cultivated state, which could be assumed to have been cultivated from inception. Id. at 1353 (citing
35 U.S.C. § 161) (emphasis in original). A plant simply discovered on uncultivated land does not
constitute a discovery within the terms of the Plant Patent Act, consistent with the requirements for
utility patents under the Patent Act of 1954. Id. at 1345.
30 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
308 (1980)).
31 Id. at 3238 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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approach could be seen in the Supreme Court’s two early decisions in American
Wood-Paper and Cochrane.
1. American Wood-Paper Co. v. The Fibre Disintegrating Co.
In American Wood-Paper Co. v. The Fibre Disintegrating Co.,32 the Supreme
Court addressed a reissued patent for paper pulp produced from wood. Pulp, out of
which paper is made, is a fibrous material consisting of “cellulose.” 33 Prior to the
patent at issue, pulp had been manufactured from straw, wood, and other vegetable
substances, and was not pure.34 Further mechanical and chemical treatment had
been required to achieve the proper consistency and dimensions for felting. 35
The original 1853 patent (to Watt and Burgess) had been granted for pulp
produced by a three-step chemical process of producing pulp ready for washing and
bleaching.36 Before the patented process began, wood and vegetable substances were
reduced to very fine shavings or cuttings and then boiled in a solution of caustic
alkali.37 The shavings were washed and pressed, and then exposed to the action of
chlorine until a portion of the shavings fell into a dark pulpy mass upon being placed
in a caustic alkali solution.38 The shavings were again washed to remove the
hydrochloric acid that had formed as a result of the exposure to chlorine and then
placed in a weak solution of caustic alkali. 39 The resulting pulp was again washed to
remove the alkali and then could be bleached by known processes. 40 The patent
claimed “the pulping and disintegrating of shavings of wood and other similar
vegetable matter for making paper, by treating them with caustic alkali, chlorine
simple, or its compounds with oxygen and alkali, in the order substantially as
described.”41 As noted by the Court, there was no process prior to 1853 by which pulp
was produced so that it was ready for washing or bleaching by a single operation;
generally, successive mechanical operations were used.42
Two patents reissued in 1863, one for “an improved manufacture of paper and
paper pulp from wood” (the process) and the other for “paper and paper pulp” (the
product).43 The product patent claimed a “pulp suitable for the manufacture of
paper, made from wood or other vegetable substances, by boiling the wood or other
vegetable substance in an alkali under pressure, substantially as described.”44 The
process patent claimed “the process of treating wood or other vegetable substance, by
Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 566 (1874).
Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 568.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 570.
38 Id. at 571.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 572.
42 Id. at 568.
43 Id. at 569.
44 Id. at 577.
32
33
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boiling it in alkali under pressure, as a process, or preparatory process, for making
pulp for the manufacture of paper from such woods or other vegetable substances
substantially as described.”45 The specification described the use of chlorine in the
process.46
The district court had held the product patent invalid as claiming matter that
was not new and the process patent as claiming a “different invention from the
original.”47 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding as to the process
patent and addressed the novelty of the product patent, determining that, if the
substance produced is not new, it is not patentable as a substance even if made by a
new process.48 The Court held that the product, unlike the process, was not novel
because it had existed prior to 1853.49 Although the patentees argued that the prior
art was not pure cellulose, and that therefore the claimed product was “different and
new,” the Supreme Court questioned “[w]hether a slight difference in the degree of
purity of an article produced by several processes justifies denominating the products
different manufactures,” but declined to decide the issue.50 The product claimed in
the patent was a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, and the pulp produced
by the prior art processes was apparently “equally suitable.” 51
The fact that the claimed product was in a more final stage than the
intermediate condition found in the prior art was immaterial to the Court’s decision,
because both products had the same consistency and fiber length properties once
processed.52 The claimed product was therefore “in no sense new” and void “for want
of novelty in the manufacture patented.”53 As one legal scholar noted:
the Court made clear (without distinguishing between naturally
occurring and non-naturally occurring but pre-existing things) that
simply increasing the purity of pre-existing pulp (by isolating the
naturally occurring cellulose from more of the “impurities” of
naturally occurring wood) did not thereby create a new thing (a new
manufacture), even if wood pulp was a distinct thing from the
cellulose that comprised it.54
Although the Court was not addressing the patentability of a true “product of
nature,” the principle articulated in American Wood Pulp is that purification or

Id. at 580.
Id. at 579.
47 Id. at 592.
48 Id. at 593 (noting that in such instances, the process, but not the product, may be
patentable).
49 Id. at 594.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 595–96.
53 Id. at 596.
54 Joshua D. Sarnoff, SHAKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 89 (Apr.
2, 2008) (preliminary discussion draft) (on file with American University Washington College of
Law), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/research-and-advocacy/ip-policy-and-lawreform (emphasis in original).
45
46
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further refinement of an existing product is not a novel product—and therefore not
patentable—even if the process of creating that product is novel.
2. Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik
A second Supreme Court case addressing the “product of nature” problem
presents the issue again as one of novelty rather than the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter. Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik addressed a reissue
patent for an “improvement in dyes or coloring matter from anthracine.” 55 The
reissue patent claimed a “[new and useful improvement] . . . for preparing alizarine
from anthracine,” which was in essence the production of a synthetic form of
alizarine.56 The patent holder sued, claiming that the reissue patent was infringed
by making and selling the invention, or dyes produced with it.57 The accused
infringer claimed that it sold alizarine lawfully made in Germany and imported into
the U.S. that was made by a newer, improved process than that described in the
reissue patent.58 The accused infringer also argued that the reissue patent was
invalid because “‘alizarine is a natural product, having a well-known definite
constitution; that it is not a composition of matter, within the meaning of the statute,
but has been well-known in the arts . . . for the purpose of dyeing . . . .’”59 The
infringers claimed that the patented product had the same chemical formula as the
natural product.60
The lower court held the reissue patent valid and infringed. 61 The Supreme
Court considered the technical literature on alizarine, which is a red coloring
obtained from rose madder with the chemical formula C14H8O4.62 The patentees
discovered a method of creating synthetic alizarine by various reactions that,
according to the literature, had the same composition and properties as vegetable
alizarine.63 The reissue patent claimed a process (an improved process over the
initial patent) and a product denominated artificial alizarine. 64 The court noted that
the specification of the original patent clearly intended the invention “to be a process
for preparing alizarine, not as a new substance prepared for the first time, but as the
substance already known as alizarine, to be prepared, however, by the new
process . . . .”65 The Supreme Court concluded that the product to be produced by the
new process was intended to have the same chemical formula as natural alizarine. 66
The Court held that because the defendant’s product was made by a different process
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 294, 294 (1884) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 294, 296.
57 Id. at 296.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 297.
60 Id. at 298.
61 Id. at 297.
62 Id. at 299.
63 Id. at 300, 304.
64 Id. at 308.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 311–12.
55
56
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and could not be identified as the product of the process of the reissue patent, the
defendant did not infringe.67 To the extent the reissue patent claimed the product
alizarine with the chemical formula C14H8O4, it was an old article; the new process
for creating the chemical was patentable, but the product itself could not be patented
because, although synthetic, it had the same composition as the well-known natural
substance.68 This Supreme Court decision established that a composition of matter
with the same chemical composition as a natural product cannot be patented
regardless of how it is derived.
B. Emergence of a “Product of Nature” Doctrine and a “Purification” Doctrine.
The “product of nature” doctrine emerged from a combination of Supreme Court,
Patent Office, and Circuit Court decisions. These cases moved away from the earlier
Supreme Court cases of deciding patent-eligibility on the basis of novelty. Instead,
the courts began to carve out a patent-ineligible “product of nature” category, where
the courts looked at whether the claimed product was distinguishable from a product
found in nature. The courts were in disagreement, however, about how to apply the
“product of nature” doctrine, or whether to even apply it at all. Many circuit courts,
for example, found that “purified” “products of nature” were patentable under the
“purification doctrine.”
1. Ex Parte Latimer
The first specific reference to the “product of nature” doctrine is in Ex parte
Latimer, a decision rejecting a patent for fiber consisting of the cellular tissues of
pine needles.69 At the time of the case, in 1889, Section 1 of the Patent Act provided
that a patent could be granted for “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used by others . . . at the time of
[the] application . . . .”70 The applicant in Latimer claimed a “new article of
manufacture” comprising the “cellular tissues of the Pinus australis eliminated in
full lengths from the silicious, resinous, and pulpy parts of the pine-needles and
subdivided into long, pliant filaments adapted to be spun and woven . . . .”71 The
applicant obtained a patent for the process, but the patent examiner rejected it,
finding the physical characteristics of the claimed product indistinguishable from any
other fiber.72

Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
69 Ex Parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, 123 (1889).
70 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, 119 § 6 (July 4, 1836).
71 Ex Parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 123.
72 Id. at 124.
67
68
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The Commissioner of Patents affirmed, upholding the primary examiner’s
rejection.73 While the decision in Latimer hints that the patent could have been
rejected based on lack of novelty, the Commissioner denied the attempt to patent the
fiber material by disavowing the concept that one could patent a “natural product”
such as “an element or a principle . . . which nature has produced and which nature
has intended to be equally for the use of all men.” 74 The decision further noted that
the differences between the useful properties of the fiber extracted from the pine tree
and the useful properties of other fibers were not due to the method of processing but
to the natural properties of the pine tree fiber. 75 Further, the fiber was unchanged
from its “natural construction” by chemical combination and was therefore not
something “new or different from the fiber in its natural state.”76 The product of
nature doctrine was therefore first formulated to preclude patent protection for a
“product whose physical characteristics are indistinguishable from those of its
naturally-occurring counterpart,” despite any novelty inherent in the process used to
produce the product, the “unprecedented status” of its discovery, or the product’s
utility.77
2. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co. is also instructive on the “product of
nature” doctrine, even though it does not directly address the doctrine. The Supreme
Court addressed what constituted a “manufacture” for purposes of the patent
statutes.78 The Supreme Court held that a rind of an orange with a small amount of
borax added did not constitute a “manufacture” as that term is used in § 101, because
the “[a]ddition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw
material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or
property. The added substance only protects the natural article . . . .”79 The Supreme
Court did not consider an orange with skin impregnated by borax patentable because
the process did not create an article having a new or distinctive form or property
than the naturally occurring orange.80
3. Kuehmsted v. Farben Fabenfabrik of Elberfeld Company
Despite the Supreme Court and the Patent Office’s prohibitions on patenting
natural products, certain circuit court cases in the early twentieth century permitted
Id. at 125–26.
Id.
75 Id. at 126.
76 Id.
77 John M. Conley & Robert Makouski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature
Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301, 322
(2003).
78 Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1931).
79 Id. at 11.
80 Id.
73
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patents on what are in essence synthetic or purified “products of nature.” In
Kuehmsted v. Farben Fabenfabriken of Elberfeld Company,81 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of a patent covering acetyl salicylic acid
(aspirin) made by heating salicylic acid with acetic anhydride and then
recrystallizing the product.82 The accused infringer claimed that the product had the
identical formula as the prior art substance. 83 The Seventh Circuit rejected the
argument that the formula of the accused product and the prior art were identical
because the substances could be physically and therapeutically different due to
impurities detectable upon a qualitative analysis.84 The patent was not barred
because the prior art product could be treated to create the claimed aspirin product
and that recrystallized product differed from the prior art. In use, the salicylic acid
in the patented product did not dissolve in the stomach therefore avoiding the side
effects of the prior art product and rendering the patented product “effective and safe
in its therapeutical results . . . .”85 The Seventh Circuit therefore held that the
patented product—in essence a purification of a prior product—was a “medicine
indisputably beneficial to mankind—something new in a useful art, such as our
patent policy was intended to promote.”86 The validity of the patent did not hinge on
the fact that it was derived from a substance containing the claimed compound and
that it was the result of purification because the prior art was “at best, a chemical
compound in an impure state.”87 This result may, in part, be dictated by the state of
chemical analysis at the time and/or the proof adduced in the lower court—the
appellate court recognized differences in the two products simply because they
performed differently, despite the lack of actual differences in the composition of the
two products.88
4. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co.
Two years later, the Second Circuit (based upon a district court opinion
authorized by Learned Hand) refused to invalidate a patent for purified adrenaline in
a controversial opinion, Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co.89 The patentee
discovered how to purify adrenaline from the adrenal glands and claimed, in essence,
any substance that had the “physiological characteristics of the glands and is
substantially pure.”90 The accused infringer argued that because the product was
simply a purified form of a substance existing in the body, it was not a new
“composition of matter” and therefore not patentable. 91 The district court held that
Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910).
Id.
83 Id. .
84 Id. at 703–04.
85 Id. at 704.
86 Id. at 705.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 701.
89 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 497 (2d Cir. 1912).
90 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 101–02 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
91 Id. at 103.
81
82
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the patent did not disclose adrenaline in a salt form and that no prior art disclosed
isolated adrenaline in anything but that form.92 In dicta, Learned Hand also noted
that the result would have been the same even if the patented product “were merely
an extracted product without change, [because] there is no rule that such products
are not patentable.”93 The patentee was the first to make pure adrenaline available
for use by removing it from gland tissue when “it became for every practical purpose
a new thing commercially and therapeutically,” and the product was therefore
patentable even if seen as a simple “purification.” 94 This decision, which has lent
support for decades to the premise that a purified natural substance can be
patented,95 has been criticized as based on an erroneous interpretation of law,
ignoring Ex Parte Latimer and perhaps misunderstanding the American Wood Paper
decision.96
5. General Electric Company v. De Forest Radio Company
In contrast, intervening cases involving purified elements unequivocally held
that “products of nature” were not patentable, whether or not the purified form of the
material existed in nature. For example, in General Electric Company v. De Forest
Radio Company, the court addressed the claim to “[s]ubstantially pure tungsten
having ductility and high tensile strength.” 97 The Third Circuit’s 1930 decision
upheld the determination that the patent was invalid, although pure tungsten, as
described in the claims, had not been found in nature. 98 As an element, tungsten’s
properties were natural by definition,99 and “a patent cannot be awarded for a
discovery or for a product of nature, or for a chemical element.” 100 Based on the
holding in General Electric, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”)
consistently rejected patents on products seen merely as purified forms of a natural
substance, including ductile uranium, 101 ductile vanadium,102 purified ultramarine,103
and purified vitamin C,104 finding that the claimed inventions were “product[s] of

Id.
Id.
94 Id. The case cited Union Carbide Co., in which the court found that crystalline calcium
carbide was patentable because it had different physical properties than the amorphous product
known in the prior art and those properties made it better suited for commercial use. Union
Carbide Co. v. Am. Carbide Co., 181 F. 104 (2d Cir. 1910).
95 Jon M. Harkness, Dicta on Adrenalin(e): Myriad Problems with Learned Hand’s Product-ofNature Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 363, 364
(2011).
96 Id. at 389, 390–91.
97 Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928).
98 Id. at 647.
99 Id. at 643.
100 Id. at 642 (citing U.S. Indus. Chem. Co. v. Theroz Co., 25 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1928)).
101 In re Marden (Marden I), 47 F.2d 957, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
102 In re Marden (Marden II), 47 F.2d 958, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
103 In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
104 In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 618 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
92
93
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nature” and that the inventor was not entitled to a patent on such a product or any of
its inherent qualities.105
6. In re Merz
In Merz, the CCPA articulated the general rule that one cannot patent a product
that simply has a greater degree of purity than the same product produced by
different methods.106 To patent the product, the inventor must show that the process
used “produces an article of such purity that it differs not only in degree but in
kind . . . .”107 Therefore, to obtain a patent, the general rule at that time required the
inventor to demonstrate that the product was, in effect, new, and had a new (and not
simply improved) use.108
7. In re Williams
Despite the strict barrier established by cases such as General Electric,
American Wood Fiber, and Cochrane, the rule stated in Parke-Davis, permitting
patents on purified natural products, seems to have carried the day in the CCPA case
of In re Williams.109 In In re Williams, the CCPA reversed the Patent and
Trademark Office’s rejection of claims to the laevo rotary form of lactone. 110 In
essence, the laevo rotary form was a purified form of a racemic mixture that
contained both the laevo rotary form and the dextro rotary form of the compound. 111
While the rejection of the claims by the patent examiner was based on lack of novelty
and obviousness, rather than a claim that the compound was not patent-eligible
subject matter, Williams expanded the ability to claim a purified product, holding
that “a pure compound may, under certain conditions, be patentable over the same
compound in an impure form . . . .”112 Even though the racemic nature of the
“impure” compound was clearly inherent in the compound, the CCPA believed that
the “pure” form was not only novel, in that it did not exist before the patentee created
it, but was also non-obvious because the prior art did not demonstrate that those
skilled in the art knew the compound was racemic, or that it was obvious to one
skilled in the art that the compound was racemic.113 This decision flies in the face of
prior precedent, including Ex Parte Latimer and General Electric, which stand for the

105 Marden I, 47 F.2d at 957. See also Marden II, 47 F.2d at 958; Merz, 97 F.2d at 600; King,
107 F.2d at 620 (noting that vitamin C was considered a known compound without naming it a
“product of nature”).
106 Merz, 97 F.2d at 601.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See Conley & Makowski, supra note 77 at 325.
110 Application of Williams, 171 F.2d 319, 319 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
111 Id. at 319–20.
112 Id. at 320 (citing Merz, 97 F.2d at 601).
113 Id.
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proposition that simply discovering a natural property of a substance and using
purification to realize that property are not patentable. 114
8. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.
The Supreme Court addressed the patentability of natural products again in
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.115 The patent claimed an inoculant for
leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected, mutually non-inhibitive strains
of different bacteria.116 The ability of leguminous plants to withdraw nitrogen from
the air is dependent on the presence of certain bacteria that infect the roots of the
plants, yet no species of that particular bacteria genus will infect the roots of all
species of leguminous plants. 117 Methods of selecting strains and producing a
bacterial culture from those strains had been known in the art, but the claimed
invention was the first inoculant to contain six rather than one species of bacteria. 118
In general, different strains of the bacterium inhibited one another. 119 The inventor
discovered certain strains of each of the six species that did not inhibit each other
and provided a mixed culture usable with multiple types of plants. 120
The Supreme Court held that the disclosed subject matter was not an “invention
or discovery”—in other words, not patent-eligible subject matter under the Patent
Act.121 The inventor did not create the effects of the bacteria; their properties were
works of nature and “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature
has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.” 122 To be patentable, the
invention must be an application of a natural phenomenon to a new and useful
end.123 The combination of the six species of bacteria did not produce a new bacteria,
change the old bacteria, or increase the utility of the bacteria.124 This case, while not
differing in effect from prior Supreme Court cases such as American Wood Fiber,
clearly analyzed the issue of patent subject matter eligibility separately from
novelty.125

114 Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, 123 (1889); Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio
Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928).
115 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
116 Id. at 128 n.1.
117 Id. at 128–29.
118 Id. at 130.
119 Id. at 129.
120 Id. at 128–30.
121 Funk, 33 U.S. at 131–32.
122 Id. at 130.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 131.
125 Id. at 131 (citing Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90, 91 (U.S.
1941)) (stating that “a product must be more than new and useful to be patented; it must also satisfy
the requirement of invention or discovery”).
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9. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Co.
While Funk Brothers seemed to emphasize that a natural phenomenon cannot
constitute patentable subject matter, the “purification” concept continued to expand
in patent law. In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Co., patent claims
directed to Vitamin B-12–active composition were determined to constitute
patentable subject matter.126 Vitamin B-12 existed in the liver of cattle, which was
used to treat pernicious anemia since 1926. 127 Prior to the claimed invention, certain
liver compounds were prepared that had the effect of treating pernicious anemia,
although the treatments were expensive and often hard to tolerate. 128 The nature of
the substance with the beneficial effect, including whether it was a hormone or
vitamin, was unknown.129 Employees of Merck, based on prior research assigned to
the drug manufacturer, eventually isolated a pure, red, crystalline material derived
from fermentates, which clinical tests confirmed to be the anti-pernicious anemia
factor, and the employees subsequently named it Vitamin B-12.130 Merck also
isolated the pure, red, crystalline material from the liver of cattle.131 The patent
claims were directed to the composition, vitamin B-12 derived from fermentates,
which the Court noted had a “very great therapeutic and commercial importance”
and was “cheaply and abundantly produced.”132
In addressing whether the compound was patentable as a product of nature, the
Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]here is nothing in the language of the Act which
precludes the issuance of a patent upon a ‘product of nature’ when it is a ‘new and
useable composition of matter,” noting that all patentable materials are “products of
nature in the sense that nature provides the basic source materials.” 133
The Fourth Circuit distinguished cases such as Funk Brothers, General Electric,
and Marden as rejecting patents on products of nature that did not meet the
requirements (novelty and non-obviousness) of the Patent Act, rather than as
establishing a per se rule that products of nature could not be patent eligible. 134 In
other words, it held that products of nature (i.e., substances that already existed in
nature) could be patent eligible if they were novel and non-obvious. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the B-12 active compositions at issue were unlike the cellulose
claimed in American Wood Fiber and the synthetic alizarine claimed in Cochrane
because, prior to Merck’s work, “[n]o one had produced even a comparable product” to
the claimed B-12 active composition and “[t]he active substance was unidentified and
unknown.”135 This holding is inherently contradictory because if the substance
already exists, but was simply unidentified and unknown, it is not “new” but simply
“discovered.”
Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 158.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 159–60.
131 Id. at 160.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 161–62.
134 Id. at 162.
135 Id. at 162–63.
126
127
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The Circuit Courts of Appeals were seemingly beginning to hold, in contradiction
to Supreme Court precedent, that discovering and isolating an active compound that
already exists in nature can be a novel composition of matter. Relying on the aspirin
(Kuehmsted) and adrenaline (Park-Davis) cases, these courts were establishing that
purification of an existing substance could produce a patentable, new product if the
difference was not only in degree, but in kind—in other words, the difference between
a substance that is therapeutically and commercially useful and one that is not. 136
C. Diamond v. Chakrabarty and the Rise of Biotech Patents.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,137 which recognized
the patent-eligibility of genetically engineered bacteria, did not explicitly rein in the
“purification principle” articulated by the district courts. The claimed bacterium was
a new strain into which two stable energy-generating plasmids were introduced to
give the bacterium enhanced “hydrocarbon degradative” properties—in other words,
the bacterium could break down multiple components of crude oil.138 The claims
directed to the product (the bacterium itself) were rejected by the examiner as a
“product of nature.”139 The Supreme Court, however, determined that the man-made
bacterium was a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of
§ 101 of the Patent Act.140
Notably in contrast to its more recent decisions, the Supreme Court stated that
the terms of the Patent Act should be given wide scope due to the use of the term
“any” in § 101, and that the courts should not “read into the patent laws limitations
and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.” 141 Given the broad language
used by Congress, statutory subject matter was intended to encompass “anything
under the sun that is made by man.” 142 The Supreme Court distinguished the
claimed man-made bacterium from unpatentable “laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas” such as “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild” because the bacterium at issue was not a previously
unknown natural phenomenon, but a “nonnaturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter––a product of human ingenuity . . . . ”143 Unlike the bacterium
in Funk Brothers, the new bacterium in Chakrabarty had “markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature and [was] one having the potential for
significant utility.”144 The crucial distinction between the claimed products in Funk
Brothers and Chakrabarty was “between products of nature . . . and human-made
invention.”145
Id. at 163.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303–04 (1980).
138 Id. at 305.
139 Id. at 306.
140 Id. at 309–10.
141 Id. at 308.
142 Id. at 309 (citing S. REP. NO. 82–1979, at 2399 (1952)).
143 Id. at 309–10 (internal citations omitted).
144 Id. at 310.
145 Id. at 313.
136
137
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the USPTO issued
guidelines on patentable subject matter for living subject matter. 146 The USPTO
believed that the Supreme Court had enunciated a very broad interpretation of the
terms “manufacture” and “composition of matter” as used in § 101, and that it had
not limited its decision to genetically engineered living organisms.147 The USPTO
believed that “the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things,
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions.”148 The guidelines stated that “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name,
character [and] use’” is patentable subject matter and the “production of articles for
use from raw materials prepared by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties or combinations whether by hand labor or by machinery,” is a
“manufacture” under § 101.149 The USPTO indicated that it would decide the
questions as to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a case-by-case
basis following the test set forth in Chakrabarty.150
Later, in 2001, the USPTO issued new utility examination guidelines, which
involved purified products of nature.151 The revised guidelines set forth that isolated
DNA molecules satisfy § 101 if there “is a specific, substantial, and credible utility”
for those molecules.152 The new guidelines noted that patenting compositions or
compounds isolated from nature follows well-established principles, and is not a new
practice, citing the Pasteur patent for yeast and the Takamine patent for
adrenaline153 (which was upheld as valid by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Parke-Davis).154
After the Chakrabarty decision, and during the time the patent office guidelines
were issued, the biotechnology industry, including the fields of genetics, drugs, and
vaccines, expanded rapidly.155 Commentators have stated that Chakrabarty “opened
the floodgates for protection of biotechnology-related inventions.”156
While early biological engineering companies were founded before the decision
in Chakrabarty, such as Cetus (1971), Genentech (1976), and Amgen (1980), 157
subsequent growth in the industry has been astounding. For example, “as of
December 31, 2003, there were 1,473 biotechnology companies in the United States,”
and “the U.S. revenues for the biotechnology industry had increased from $8 billion
in 1992 to $39.2 billion.”158 By December 31, 2008, there were 1502 U.S.
See MPEP, supra note 27, § 2105.
Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001).
152 Id. at 1093.
153 Id.
154 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1912).
155 Douglas Robinson & Nina Medlock, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A Retrospective on 25 Years
of Biotech Patents, 17 INTELL. PROP & TECH. J. 12, 12 (2005).
156 Id.
157 Eugene Russo, Learning How to Manipulate DNA’s Double Helix Has Fuelled Job Growth in
Biotechnology During the Past 50 Years, 421 NATURE 456, 456 (2003).
158 Robinson & Medlock, supra note 155, at 13.
146
147
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biotechnology companies with 195,000 employees,159 although that figure decreased
to 98,560 by the end of 2011. 160 The U.S. biotechnology industry spent $17.9 billion
on research and development in 2003,161 which increased to $30 billion in 2008. 162
Technologies developed by the industry include not only recombinant DNA
technology, which was the original focus of the biotech industry in the 1970s, but
monoclonal antibodies, cloning, protein engineering, biosensors, tissue engineering,
stem cell technology, and vaccines.163
The number of patent applications and issued patents on biotechnology-related
inventions has risen dramatically since Chakrabarty,164 climbing from 2,160 in 1989
to 7,763 in 2002.165 Biotechnology patents issued over the last twenty-five years
“have covered a wide range of technologies and products from medicine and
diagnostics for treating diseases to agriculture and environmental products for
feeding the world’s growing population and safeguarding the environment.” 166
The Supreme Court did not revisit the patentability of a “product of nature” in
the thirty years since Chakrabarty until its Prometheus decision in March 2012.167
Although the Federal Circuit had upheld the validity of several gene patents, 168 none
of its cases until Prometheus directly addressed the question of whether such
compositions encompass patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 or cannot
be patented because they are “products of nature.” 169
III. BACKGROUND ON THE “LAW OF NATURE” EXCEPTION IN PROCESS PATENTS
The law on the patentability of so-called “products of nature” developed in
tandem with the patentability of “abstract ideas” or “natural principles” inherent in
the patentability of processes. 170 The discussion of patentability of “abstract ideas” or
“natural principles” is an exception to subject-matter eligibility similar to the “law of

159 ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2008 30 (2008)
[hereinafter BEYOND BORDERS 2008].
160 ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2012 27 (2012)
[hereinafter BEYOND BORDERS 2012].
161 Robinson & Medlock, supra note 155, at 13.
162 BEYOND BORDERS 2008, supra note 159, at 30.
163 BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 2008 2, 19–21, 36–
37, 83 (2008).
164 Robinson and Medlock, supra note 155, at 13.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303–04 (2012).
168 See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783–85
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
169 See Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that the
Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme Court has never “directly decided the issue of the
patentability of isolated DNA molecules”). Although the Federal Circuit had upheld the validity of
several gene patents, no case directly addressed “the question of whether such patents encompass
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Id.
170 See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94, 1300 (noting that abstract ideas, mathematical and
scientific principles, and laws or products of nature are not patentable subject matter).
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nature” doctrine. Below is a discussion of the development of this doctrine in relation
to process patents.
A. Early Cases on the Patentability of Process Patents
1. Tilghman v. Proctor
In the early cases discussing the patentability of processes, it appeared that the
novelty could stem, to a certain extent, from the natural principle involved, such as
the operation of temperature and pressure. For example, in Tilghman v. Proctor, the
Supreme Court found patentable a process for the “manufacturing of fat acids and
glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature and
pressure.”171 The apparatus used was admittedly not novel.172 Further, although the
specification described a specific apparatus, the claims were not limited to that
apparatus, because the process, not the apparatus, was claimed. 173 The inventor
“discovered that fat can be dissolved into its constituent elements by the use of water
alone under a high degree of heat and pressure.” 174 While the invention was based
on the chemical principle that “the elements of neutral fat require to be severally
united with an atomic equivalent of water in order to separate from each other and
become free,” the Supreme Court characterized the invention as “a particular mode of
bringing about the desired chemical union between the fatty elements and water”
albeit not confined to a particular machine, finding that it was “not for a mere
principle.”175 The claims did not preclude the use of other methods to separate fatty
acids in glycerin from fatty bodies, such as sulfuric acid distillation or steam
distillation.176 Although arguably stating a “natural law” in the claims—that fat
subjected to water at high temperature and pressure will dissolve into fatty acids—
the Supreme Court did not hold the patent invalid on the basis that it was simply a
natural law or that it preempted the broader, natural principle that high
temperature and pressure tend to break chemical bonds.177
2. O’Reilly v. Morse
Another early case had sustained the validity of a process for creating
vulcanized rubber by treating rubber with heat. 178
The classic Goodyear
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 709 (1880).
Id. at 718.
173 Id. at 720–22.
174 Id. at 721.
175 Id. at 729.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 730, 734.
178 Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 794 (1869). The claim was to “the curing
of caoutchouc, or India-rubber, by subjecting it to the action of a high degree of artificial heat,
substantially as herein described, and for the purposes specified.” Id.
171
172

[13:397 2014] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

418

vulcanization patent wholly preempted the “natural phenomenon” that subjecting
rubber to a high degree of heat when mixed with sulfur and a mineral salt would
make it more durable and useful.179 In O’Reilly v. Morse,180 the Supreme Court
sustained the validity of a patent for a process of using electromagnetism to produce
distinguishable signs for telegraphy.181 One of the claims, however, which covered
the use of “electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,” was disallowed because the claim was
not tied to any particular process or machinery.182 The Supreme Court later
explained that “the use of magnetism as a motive power, without regard to the
particular process with which it was connected in the patent, could not be claimed,
but that its use in that connection could.”183 On the other hand, Alexander Graham
Bell’s invention, the use of electric current to transmit vocal or other sounds, did not
purport to claim electrical current in its natural statute but claimed “putting a
continuous current, in a closed circuit, into a certain specified condition, suited to the
transmission of vocal and other sounds, and using it in that condition for that
purpose.”184 Stated differently, the claim was not “one for the use of electricity
distinct from the particular process with which it is connected in his patent.” 185 The
early cases allowed “natural” principles when tied to a specific process or machine.
3. Gottschalk v. Benson
The Supreme Court readdressed what constituted a patentable “process” again
in Gottschalk v. Benson.186 Decided in 1972, the case involved a patent for a method
of converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals for use with
general purpose computers of any type.187 The method was an algorithm—a set of
rules for solving a problem in a finite number of steps. 188 In this case, although the
computer performed the conversion, it could also be done “mentally” by a person. 189
The Supreme Court held that the claimed method was not patentable because
“[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”190 The Supreme Court primarily took issue, it seems, with the
breadth of the claims, stating that the process claims were “so abstract and
sweeping” they covered both “known and unknown uses” of the conversion process,
“performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without
Id. at 795.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 86 (1853).
181 Id. at 136.
182 Id. at 86, 112–13.
183 Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 8 S. Ct. 778, 782 (1888).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 65.
189 Id. at 67.
190 Id. at 67.
179
180
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any apparatus.”191 The Supreme Court distinguished between processes that are
abstract and ones that transform an article to a different state or use a particular
machine.192 While not limiting patentable claims to processes either tied to a
particular machine or that transformed articles or materials into a different state,
the Supreme Court found that the claimed process had no use except with a general
purpose computer and thus patenting the process would “wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm
itself.”193
4. Parker v. Flook
Parker v. Flook expanded upon the principles set forth in Benson in addressing a
process patent using an algorithm. 194 The Court held that the only novel feature of
the claimed process was the mathematical formula, and that limiting the claims to a
particular application of that formula did not render an unpatentable law of nature
patentable.195 Adding post-solution activity that was conventional or obvious (Flook’s
activity consisted of adjusting the alarm limit) could not “transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process . . .”196
Other than citing examples of inventions containing mathematical algorithms or
natural processes that were patentable, Flook did not provide substantive guidance
as to when claims containing a law of nature constituted patentable subject matter.
The decision simply stated that “[t]he process itself, not merely the mathematical
algorithm, must be new and useful” and stated that the process must be considered
for purposes of determining whether it was patent-eligible as if the algorithm were in
the prior art.197 Flook seemed to institute a “point of novelty” test requiring that the
novelty of an invention lie outside the “law of nature” or algorithm utilized.198 This
test was soon rejected, but would bob its head up now and then, until being adopted
in Prometheus.199

Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
193 Id. at 71–72.
194 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86, 594–96 (1978).
195 Id. at 589–91.
196 Id. at 589–90.
197 Id. at 591–92.
198 Id. at 589, 590–91.
199 See, e.g., Crocs, Inc., v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting
that when “determining whether an accused product infringes a patented design, this court applies
the ‘ordinary observer’ test, without any ‘point of novelty’ perspective.”); Egyptian Goddess, Inc., v.
Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the point of novelty test); Titan Tire Corp.
v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding the point of novelty test as
problematic because “it might cause the court to focus ‘on whether the accused design has
appropriated a single specified feature of the claimed design, rather than on the proper inquiry, i.e.,
whether the accused design has appropriated the claimed design as a whole.’”).
191
192
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B. The Machine or Transformation Test for Process Patents
1. Diamond v. Diehr
In a case that is difficult to reconcile with Flook—Diamond v. Diehr—the
Supreme Court found a patent on a process for curing synthetic rubber subjectmatter eligible.200 The process claimed in Diehr functioned by continuously updating
a mathematical calculation of the time to left cure, as a function of temperature and
pressure, in order to determine when the machine should open the mold. 201 Of
course, the mathematical equation used in that process was, standing alone, a
scientific principle and abstract, but was incorporated in a process that used a mold
to shape the raw material under heat and pressure and then cure the rubber in the
mold.202 The claims involved the transformation of an article—raw, uncured,
synthetic rubber—into “a different state or thing.”203 That the claimed method used
the Arrhenius equation, a previously known scientific principle, did not render it
patent-ineligible because the claims were not an attempt to patent a mathematical
formula, but were “drawn to an industrial process.”204 Further, the claims did not
preempt the use of the equation, but only sought to “foreclose from others the use of
that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.” 205
Diehr, in essence, began to crystallize the so-called machine or transformation
test, noting that the patent eligibility of a process depended on whether it was tied to
a particular machine or transformed an article “to a different state or thing.”206
While Diehr reiterated the general rule that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection, 207 it specifically rejected the
“point of novelty” test set forth in Flook, stating that process claims must be
considered “as a whole” and that it is “inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and
new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.” 208
Diehr noted that a process itself could be patentable even though all of the steps
were already known in the art. 209 Indeed, the point of novelty approach outlined in
Flook presents several sticky problems, including the fact that the novelty in many
inventions lies in underlying scientific principles.210 It should also be noted that in
Flook and Diehr, the natural law or abstract concept ideas were being applied to
process claims, not claims to particular “manufacture[s]” or “composition[s] of
matter,” which present different policy issues. 211
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
Id. at 177–78.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 184.
204 Id. at 192–93.
205 Id. at 187.
206 Id. at 184.
207 Id. at 185.
208 Id. at 188.
209 Id.
210 See Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2011).
211 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185–87.
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As of the early 1990s, however, Chakrabarty and Diehr (and to a certain extent
Flook and Benson) had broadly interpreted § 101, especially in terms of “products of
nature,” which are generally claimed as compositions of matter or manufacture and
as “natural law” principles integrated into process claims. 212 Chakrabarty noted
that the comprehensive terms of § 101, including the word “any,” demonstrated that
Congress wanted the patent laws to be given a wide scope. 213 Diehr warned against
reading “limitations and conditions” that Congress had not expressed into § 101.214
The Supreme Court expansively read the statutory term “composition of matter” as
one that “has been construed consistent with its common usage to include ‘all
compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they
be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases,
fluids, powders or solids.’”215 Likewise, a “manufacture” under § 101 was interpreted
“in accordance with its dictionary definition to mean ‘the production of articles for
use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.’”216
A
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” was patent eligible if it demonstrated “the
hand of man,” or in other words, was “a product of human ingenuity ‘having a
distinct name, character [and] use.’”217
2. Bilski v. Kappos
In 2010, the Supreme Court seemed, if anything, to adopt and expand the
holding of Diehr in Bilski v. Kappos,218 which the blog Patently-O characterized as
“business as usual.”219 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Bilski formally presented
and applied the machine-or-transformation test, holding that a claimed process is
patent-eligible under § 101 if: “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”220 The Federal
Circuit required one of those two tests to be met for claims to a method to be
considered patent-eligible subject matter.221

212 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 407 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such expansive
terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184
(holding that “a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber falls within
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
213 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
214 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
215 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280
(D.D.C. 1957)).
216 Id. at 308 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
217 Id. at 309–10.
218 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229, 3230–31 (2010).
219 Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Bilski v. Kappos, PATENTLY-O (June 28, 2010),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/bilski-v-kappos-business-methods-out-software-stillpatentable.html.
220 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
221 Id. at 961–62.
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In its modification of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bilski, the Supreme Court
reiterated the broad nature of § 101—which makes its later pronouncement in
Myriad puzzling—stating that, “[i]n choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by
the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would
be given wide scope.”222 The Supreme Court again reiterated the exclusions from
patent eligible subject matter for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas” noting that these were “not required by the statutory text” but have “defined
the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”223
In light of the broad reach of the definition of statutory subject matter under the
Patent Act, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the
“machine or transformation test,” in determining what constituted a “process” for
purposes of § 101, was too rigid in light of the mandate that the “courts ‘should not
read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed.’”224 The Supreme Court held that the “machine or transformation” test
was not the exclusive test for patent eligibility of a process, but simply a “useful and
important clue” to whether a process constitutes statutory subject matter under
§ 101.225 Ironically, in light of its later decision in Prometheus, the Supreme Court
noted that limiting patent eligibility to those inventions that meet the “machine-ortransformation test” may create “uncertainty as to the patentability of software,
advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear
programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital signals” 226 (and
such uncertainty has arisen in the past few years, attributable in part to recent
Supreme Court precedent). Although Bilski defined patentable-subject matter
broadly, it held that the patent claims at issue, which were directed to the concept of
hedging risk and the application of that concept to energy markets, were invalid as
an attempt to patent abstract ideas according to the holdings in Benson, Flook, and
Diehr.227
C. Post-Bilski “Law of Nature” Cases
After Bilski, the Federal Circuit addressed a wide variety of “natural law” or
“abstract idea” cases and attempted to apply Supreme Court precedent addressing
the scope of § 101.228 An expected result from the vague opinion in Bilski, the scope
of § 101 has not been clarified by subsequent precedent.229

Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
Id. at 3225.
224 Id. at 3225–26 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
225 Id. at 3327.
226 Id. at 3227; see also CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
227 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229–30.
228 See, e.g., CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1276–84 (finding that “the asserted claims drawn to
methods, computer-readable media, and systems are not patent eligible and hence invalid under
§ 101.”); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066–70 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
222
223
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1. Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft Corporation
In Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft Corporation, the Federal
Circuit addressed the patentability, under § 101, of method patents related to digital
image half-toning.230 Half-toning techniques bridge the gap between color-specific
arrays of pixels created by a computer and computer displays, and printers that can
only use a limited number of primary colors to display digital images. 231 Half-toning
simulates a continuous tone image through the use of dots, allowing computers to
“present many shades and color tones with a limited number of pixel colors.”232 The
technique places “the dots of primary colors in a formation that gives the viewer the
illusion of many more shades of gray or varying colors.”233 As the Court explained,
“Digital halftoning technology thus allows computer displays and printers to render
an approximation of an image by using fewer colors or shades of gray than the
original image.”234 The challenged invention was essentially software (presumably
consisting of algorithms) involving an “improved blue noise mask . . . stored in a
computer’s memory, to carry out a pixel-by-pixel comparison of the mask to the
digital image.”235 The Federal Circuit found that the subject matter of the patent
was a “‘process’ for rendering a half-tone image,” which qualified as patent-eligible
subject matter “under both the categorical language of section 101 and the process
definition in section 100,” subject only to the Supreme Court’s three exceptions to
subject matter eligibility.236 The Federal Circuit found that the claimed process was
not too “abstract,” holding that the invention presented “functional and palpable
applications in the field of computer technology,” including a “method of and
apparatus for the halftone rendering of grayscale images in which a digital data
processor is utilized in a simple and precise manner to accomplish the halftone
rendering.”237 Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Diehr, the Federal
Circuit found that the patentees were not seeking to patent a mathematical formula,
but instead sought patent protection for the process of half-toning in computer
applications, and therefore the claims were directed toward patent-eligible subject
matter.238

(finding the methods of evaluating and improving safety of immunization schedules “reasonably
meet the threshold of § 101 eligibility”).
229 See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Our opinions
spend page after page revisiting our cases and those of the Supreme Court, and still we continue to
disagree vigorously over what is or is not patentable subject matter.”).
230 Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 865–66 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
231 Id. at 862–63.
232 Id. at 863.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 864.
236 Id. at 868.
237 Id. at 868–69.
238 Id. at 869.
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2. Ultramercial LLC v. Hulu LLC
In Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC,239 the court characterized the “abstractness”
exception to subject-matter eligibility as having “presented a different set of
interpretive problems, particularly for the § 101 ‘process’ category.”240 It further
noted that “[b]oth members of the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized the
difficulty of providing a precise formula or definition for the judge-made ineligible
category of abstractness.”241 The Federal Circuit held that the claimed invention, a
patent for a method of monetizing and distributing copyrighted products over the
Internet, was not so manifestly abstract as to render it ineligible for patent
protection.242 In noting that “[a]lthough abstract principles are not eligible for patent
protection, an application of an abstract idea may well be deserving of patent
protection[,]” the Federal Circuit stated that “inventions with specific applications or
improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that
they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”243 The
patents at issue, it held, disclosed a practical application of the idea that advertising
can be used as a form of currency, disclosing “a particular method for monetizing
copyrighted products” consisting of specific steps.244 Although “the broadly claimed
method . . . d[id] not specify a particular mechanism for delivering media content to
the consumer . . . [the] breadth and lack of specificity d[id] not render the claimed
subject matter impermissibly abstract.”245 When the Supreme Court later vacated
this decision for further consideration in light of Prometheus,246 the Federal Circuit
affirmed its original holding, finding that the subject matter of the patent was a
“‘process’ within the language and meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.”247 It noted that,
because patents are presumed valid, lack of patent-eligible subject matter under
§ 101 must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.248 The crucial distinction is
whether the claim is an “application of an abstract idea” (and therefore patenteligible) or “to the abstract idea itself” (and therefore not patent-eligible).249
3. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.
The Federal Circuit has found other method patents ineligible under § 101,
however. In CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., the court addressed a claim
to a “process for verifying the validity of credit card transactions over the Internet”
and a “computer readable medium containing program instructions for executing the
Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id.
241 Id. at 1327.
242 Id. at 1329–30.
243 Id. at 1327, 1328 (citations omitted).
244 Id. at 1328.
245 Id. at 1329.
246 See WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431, 2431 (2012).
247 Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
248 Id. at 1338.
249 Id. at 1343 (emphases in original).
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same process.”250 The Federal Circuit has held that the method claim was not tied to
a particular machine (the “Internet”), because even if the Internet could be
considered a machine, it did not perform the steps of the claimed method and the
claims did not require use of the Internet because the infringer could obtain the data
from other sources, including databases. 251 Although under Bilski, the claimed
method need not be tied to a particular machine, the court found that the patent did
not “recite patent-eligible subject matter because it [wa]s drawn to an unpatentable
mental process.”252 The claim was not limited in scope to any particular fraud
detection mechanism, and therefore the method could be performed by the human
mind.253 Specifically, the claim extended to “any method of detecting credit card
fraud based on information relating past transactions to a particular ‘Internet
address,’”254 including methods that could be performed by the human mind. 255
The other challenged claim—a “Beauregard” claim “to a computer readable
medium (e.g., a disk, hard drive, or other data storage device) containing program
instructions for a computer to perform a particular process”256—was likewise found
not patent-eligible because it was directed to “a method for detecting credit card
fraud”257 rather than “‘drawn to a specific’ computer readable medium.”258 The court
stated, “[T]he incidental use of a computer to perform the mental process . . . [steps]
d[id] not impose a sufficiently meaningful limit on the claim’s scope . . . [to] make the
otherwise unpatentable method patent-eligible under § 101.”259 Both claims were in
essence a method consisting of “only the general approach of obtaining information
about credit card transactions utilizing an Internet address and then using that
information in some undefined manner to determine if the credit card transaction is
valid.”260 Both claims were therefore invalid under § 101 because they claim
unpatentable mental processes or abstract ideas. 261
4. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber
In Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, the Federal Circuit addressed the patent eligibility
of a “computer-aided method and system . . . for processing credit applications over
electronic networks.”262 In essence, the method proposed a “‘central processor,’ which
receives credit application data from dealers, processes the data to conform to the
individual application forms of different banks, forwards the completed applications
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1370.
252 Id. at 1371.
253 Id. at 1372.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1372.
256 Id. at 1373.
257 Id. at 1374.
258 Id. at 1374–75.
259 Id. at 1375.
260 Id. at 1376.
261 Id. at 1376–77.
262 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
250
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to banks selected by the dealer, receives answers from the banks, and forwards those
answers back to the dealer.”263 The Federal Circuit held that the claims were
“invalid as being directed to an abstract idea preemptive of a fundamental concept or
idea that would foreclose innovation in this area.” 264 The claims described the
concept of “processing [application] information through a clearinghouse,” which, if
allowed, would “wholly preempt the clearinghouse concept.”265 The claims were not
limited to a specific application or algorithm, nor tied to a specific machine. 266
Limiting the claims to a particular application (the car loan application process),
could not render the method patent eligible, because under Bilski and Diehr limiting
the claims to a “particular technological environment,” without more, was
insufficient.267
5. Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease, LLC
In Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease, LLC, the Federal Circuit
likewise held that a method patent, for creating real estate investment instruments
adapted for performing tax-deferred exchanges, was impermissibly abstract.268 The
claims disclosed “an investment tool not requiring the use of a computer” as a method
involving several conceptual steps. 269 The Federal Circuit held that the invention’s
“intertwinement with deeds, contracts, and real property” did not transform the
abstract method “into patentable subject matter merely because of connections to the
physical world . . . .”270 The claims with an additional limitation “requir[ing] the
computer to ‘generate a plurality of deedshares’” were likewise not directed to patent
eligible subject matter because the use of the computer did not “impose meaningful
limits on the claim’s scope.”271 Here, the invention did not “require[] intricate and
complex computer programming,” nor did it have a “specific application to the
Internet and a cybermarket environment” or represent “advances in computer
technology.”272 The computer limitations were simply “insignificant post-solution
activity.”273

Id.
Id. at 1333.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 1333–34.
267 Id. at 1334.
268 Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
269 Id. at 1322.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1323.
272 Id.
273 Id.
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6. Comparing CLS Bank International v. Alice Co. with Bancorp Services LLC v. Sun
Life Assurance Co.
The differences between different Federal Circuit panels on the scope of the
“abstract idea” exception to subject matter eligibility and the difficulty in
establishing clear standards is best shown by the different holdings and rationales in
two Federal Circuit decisions in the same month: CLS Bank International v. Alice
Corporation Pty.274 and Bancorp Services, LLC. v. Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada (U.S.).275 In both cases, the Federal Circuit addressed the patentability of
inventions implemented by computers. In CLS Bank, the Federal Circuit addressed
the patentability of “a computerized trading platform for exchanging obligations in
which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first and second party” in a
manner that eliminates “settlement risk.”276 The method claims included, inter alia,
steps for: (1) creating shadow credit and debit records; (2) obtaining from the
exchange institutions a start-of-the-day balance for both the shadow credit record
and shadow debit record; (3) adjusting the shadow credit and/or shadow debit record
for completed transactions; (4) allowing only those transactions that do not result in
the value of the shadow debit being less than the value of the shadow credit; and (5)
instructing the exchange institutions as to exchange credits or debits to the credit
record and debit record of the respective parties. 277 There were also system and
product (media) claims that implemented the claimed method.278
The Federal Circuit noted that the “[t]he abstractness of the ‘abstract ideas’ test
to patent eligibility has become a serious problem, leading to great uncertainty and
to the devaluing of inventions of practical utility and economic potential” 279 and that
“the dividing line between inventions that are directed to patent ineligible abstract
ideas and those that are not remains elusive.”280 The Court tried to establish a test
for what is an “abstract idea” stating that “a claim drawn to a specific way of doing
something with a computer is likely to be patent eligible whereas a claim to nothing
more than the idea of doing that thing on a computer may not [be].”281 Further,
patent eligibility must be determined based on the claims as a whole. 282 The Federal
Circuit held that if “it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a patent
ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to be
inadequate under § 101.”283 Likewise, it is inappropriate to hold that claims are
directed to an “abstract idea” under § 101 “[u]nless the single most reasonable
understanding is that a claim is directed to nothing more than a fundamental truth
274 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 685 F.3d 1341, 1355, reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
275 Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
276 CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1343.
277 Id. at 1343–44.
278 Id. at 1344–45.
279 Id. at 1348–49.
280 Id. at 1349.
281 Id. at 1351 (emphases in original).
282 Id. at 1351–52.
283 Id. at 1352.
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or disembodied concept . . . .”284 The rationale for the Federal Circuit’s decision was
that the “implicit” exception for abstractness created by the Supreme Court should
not be permitted to override Congress’s intent in creating broad patent subject
matter eligibility in § 101 of the Patent Act.285 In accordance with this limited view
of the “abstract idea” exception, the Federal Circuit held that the method, system and
product claims at issue were patent-eligible subject matter,286 finding that the claims
as a whole were directed to more than a fundamental truth or disembodied concept,
because they required computer implementation and were limited to a specific
application of the business concept.287
A few weeks later, a different panel of the Federal Circuit held in Bancorp
Services that claims to a system for administering and tracking the value of separateaccount life insurance policies, issued pursuant to corporate-owned life insurance and
bank-owned life insurance were not patent-eligible.288 The method at issue disclosed
“formulae for determining the values required to manage a stable value protected life
insurance policy.”289 As construed by the Federal Circuit, the dependent claims
“requir[ed] that the method be ‘performed by a computer.’”290 The Federal Circuit
concluded that the claims at issue covered “no more than abstract ideas and therefore
do not recite patent-eligible subject matter.”291
Although computers offer capabilities and utilities that can constitute patenteligible subject matter, they are basically “electronic device[s] for performing
mathematical or logical operations.”292 The use of a computer to implement an
otherwise patent-ineligible process therefore cannot “circumvent the prohibition
against patenting abstract ideas.”293 To confer subject-matter eligibility, the use of
the computer must be integral to the claimed invention and “impose meaningful
limits on the scope of those claims.”294 Here, the use of a computer did not render the
claims patent-eligible because the computer was used only for performing
calculations and it did not limit the scope of the claims in any way. 295 The method for
determining the values at issue was “a matter of mere mathematical computation”
and claimed nothing more than an “abstract idea of managing a stable value
protected life insurance policy by performing calculations and manipulating the
results.”296 This situation contrasts that in CLS Bank, where computer limitations
played “a significant part in the performance of the invention,” and the claims were
“limited to a very specific application of the [inventive] concept.”297 Yet as in CLS
Id.
Id. at 1352 n.3.
286 Id. at 1356.
287 Id. at 1353–56.
288 Bancorp Servs., LLC. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1280–81 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
289 Id. at 1270.
290 Id. at 1271.
291 Id. at 1277.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 1278.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 1280.
297 Id. at 1280–81 (emphases in original).
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Bank, the Federal Circuit did note the importance of construing the claims before
performing an analysis of subject matter eligibility under § 101, although it
construed the claims in this case where the district court declined to do so. 298
The Federal Circuit granted en banc review in the CLS case and affirmed the
decision that the asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.299 No single opinion of the Court had a majority,300 so the
CLS decision fails to provide clear guidance in analyzing the “abstract ideas”
exception to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. While the subject-matter
eligibility exception for “abstract ideas” does not directly impact the “product of
nature” exception, the Federal Circuit’s (and perhaps the Supreme Court’s) opinion
on whether such exceptions should be narrowly or broadly construed, and whether
§ 101 should be a threshold determination, will affect any “product of nature”
analysis. CLS did not state that subject matter eligibility need always be addressed
first, but one of the plurality opinions stated that “district courts may exercise their
discretion to begin elsewhere when they perceive that another section of the Patent
Act might provide a clearer and more expeditious path to resolving a dispute.” 301
7. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC
After Bilski, the Federal Circuit also ruled on the patentability of diagnostic
method claims in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC.302 Initially, the district
court granted summary judgment of invalidity of the asserted claims because they
claimed an abstract idea,303 and that decision was perfunctorily affirmed on appeal
by the Federal Circuit.304 What is, in hindsight, a curious decision in light of its later
decision in Prometheus, the Supreme Court vacated Classen in light of Bilski and
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit.305 Upon consideration of Bilski, the
Federal Circuit determined that the patent claims, directed toward a method of
lowering the risk of chronic immune-related disorders, were patent-eligible subject
matter, although the only physical step in the claimed method was administering the
vaccine, and many of the steps constituted no more than a “correlation” between
vaccines and chronic immune disorder.306 Judge Newman dissented, stating, “The
immunization step of the #739 patent, like updating the alarm limit in Parker v.
Flook, is nothing more than post-solution activity” that cannot “transform the
unpatentable principle—that a correlation exists between vaccination schedules and

Id. at 1280.
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
300 Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
301 Id. at 1284.
302 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
303 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *6
(D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 304 Fed. App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct.
3541 (2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
304 Classen, 304 Fed. App’x. at 867.
305 Classen, 130 S. Ct. at 3541.
306 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1068–69.
298
299
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incidence of chronic immune disease—into a patentable process.”307 This decision,
particularly the dissent, foreshadows Prometheus,308 although it would have been
difficult at the time to predict the result because Bilski seemed to broaden what the
subject-matter eligible and seemed careful not to disturb prior precedent.

IV. COMBINING THE “PRODUCT OF NATURE” AND “LAW OF NATURE”
DOCTRINES IN PROMETHEUS AND MYRIAD
A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Prometheus
In 2012, the Supreme Court again addressed what constitutes a “law of nature”
in a decision that may have far reaching implications on the patentability of articles
of “manufacture” or “compositions of matter” that are arguably products of nature.
In Mayo v. Prometheus,309 the Supreme Court addressed whether a method for
calibrating a proper dosage of drugs was patent-eligible. While the decision recited
the oft-repeated adage that, “Although ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas’ are not patentable subject matter . . . ‘an application of a law of
nature . . . to a known structure or process may [be],’”310 it noted that, to be
patentable, an invention must be tied to a concrete application of the law of nature in
question.311
The method claim at issue involved the use of thiopurine drugs to treat
autoimmune diseases.312 These drugs are metabolized by the body, producing
metabolites in the bloodstream.313 Because patients metabolize the drug differently,
it has been difficult for physicians to determine whether the dosage for a particular
patient “is too high, risking harmful side effects, or too low, and . . . likely
ineffective.”314 The patent claims at issue disclosed a process to identify correlations
between metabolite levels and potential harm. 315 The claims included: (1) an
“administering” step, requiring the drug to be administered to the patient; (2) a
“determining step,” requiring the level of the metabolite in the patient’s blood to be
measured; and (3) a “wherein step” essentially describing the level of metabolite
concentrations above which harmful side effects are likely and below which the drug
dosage is likely ineffective.316 The Supreme Court held that the claims at issue “set
Id. at 1079 (Moore, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1076–81; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1305 (2012) (holding that the method claims of a diagnostic process using thiopurine drugs
were ineligible patent subject matter, because the correlations between the administered drug and
the concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood of the patient were laws of nature).
309 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
310 Id. at 1293–94.
311 Id. at 1294.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 1295.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.
307
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forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will
prove ineffective or cause harm.”317
The Supreme Court noted that it has long held that § 101, which defines patenteligible subject matter, contains an “important implicit exception” for “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”318 Natural phenomena, such as new
minerals or wild plants, or natural laws, such as the law of gravity, are
“manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none”319 and
“are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” 320
To be patentable, a process using a natural law must contain an “‘inventive
concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the natural law itself.” 321 The Supreme Court held that the
claimed processes lacked an inventive concept (other than the natural law itself)
because the steps of the process (administering the drug and determining the level of
metabolite in the blood) involved “well-understood, routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by researchers in the field.” 322 The Supreme Court held that
the relationship between the concentration of metabolites in the blood and the
effectiveness of the drug was a law of nature because it was a consequence of a
natural process—the way thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body. 323 The
other steps were nothing more than “conventional or obvious” “[pre]-solution activity”
insufficient “to transform a[] . . . law of nature into a patent-eligible” process.324
In rendering its decision, which in essence resurrected the “point of novelty” test,
the Supreme Court attempted to harmonize its prior decisions in Diamond v. Diehr325
and Parker v. Flook,326 two process cases that involved natural laws and that were,
for all practical purposes, irreconcilable. 327 The Supreme Court, in interpreting
Diehr, claimed that, while the process in Diehr involved the use of a mathematical
equation, “the additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process
as a whole.”328 The Court’s statement that Diehr “nowhere suggested that all these
steps, or at least the combination of those steps, were in context obvious, already in
use, or purely conventional,” 329 is not supported by the record, however. As noted in
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1293.
319 Id. (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
320 Id.
321 Id. at 1294.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 1297.
324 Id. at 1298.
325 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1981) (holding that the claim fell within the § 101
categories of patentable subject matter because the claim was not merely “an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber
products”).
326 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) (finding that the method, which included a
mathematical formula for updating alarm limits during the catalytic conversion process, was not
patentable).
327 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 1299.
317
318
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the Diehr opinion, the patent examiner specifically rejected the claims as nonpatentable subject matter because the steps carried out in the computer were nonstatutory subject matter, and the remaining steps—installing rubber in the press and
the closing of the press—were “conventional and necessary to the process and cannot
be the basis of patentability.” 330 Nevertheless, Prometheus characterized the process
steps in Diehr as adding “something” significant and “transform[ing] the process into
an inventive application of the formula.” 331
By contrast, Prometheus characterized the process in Flook as an unpatentable
formula for computing an updated alarm system because the claims lacked an
explanation of how the variables would be selected, a disclosure of the chemical
processes at work, or a means of adjusting the alarm limit.332 The Supreme Court
characterized the claims in Flook as directed to non-statutory subject matter because
the other steps in the process did not limit the claim to a particular application. 333
Further, the process contained no “inventive concept” other than the algorithm
because the chemical processes involved, the practice of monitoring the process
variable, and the uses of alarm limits were all “well known.”334 While the Supreme
Court tried to reconcile its prior decisions in Flook and Diehr, Prometheus adopts the
Flook “point of novelty” test, and requires that if a process includes a natural law or
abstract concepts, the other steps in the process must be non-obvious or more than
routine for the process to be patent-eligible.335
Arguably, Prometheus only applies to process or method claims, and not to
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” claims. Extended to its logical conclusion,
however, Prometheus could have a substantial effect on such claims, because if a
“product of nature” is subjected to nothing more than “routine, conventional” activity
and claimed as a manufacture or composition of matter, it could be ruled non-eligible
subject matter even if it does not exist in nature and only exists through the “hand of
man.”336
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Myriad
Despite hopes to the contrary, the final word on the scope of the “product of
nature” exception to patent-eligibility was not forthcoming in the cases addressing
the patentability of isolated DNA, which is typically claimed as a composition of
matter.337 Initially, the Federal Circuit upheld the patentability of DNA and isolated
DNA in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180–81.
Prometheus, 132 U.S. at 1299.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 1299–300.
336 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (finding that the micro-organism
constitutes patentable subject matter because his claim is “not to a hitherto unknown natural
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter”).
337 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116, 2117,
2219–20 (2013).
330
331
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Office based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers,
which the Federal Circuit believed controlled the analysis.338 The Supreme Court
initially vacated that decision and directed the Federal Circuit to reconsider its
decision based on Prometheus.339
On remand, the Federal Circuit again held that that cDNA and isolated DNA
constitute patent-eligible subject matter, with each of the panel members (Judges
Lourie, Bryson, and Moore) adhering to their previous opinions in the case.340 The
Federal Circuit held that Prometheus does not control the determination of whether
claims to a “composition of matter,” such as isolated DNA, are patent-eligible subject
matter because “compositions of matter” are “expressly authorized as suitable patenteligible subject matter in § 101.”341 Instead, “while [Prometheus] and earlier decisions
concerning method claim patentability provide valuable insights and illuminate broad,
foundational principles, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk
Brothers set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of
compositions of matter . . . .”342
The Federal Circuit held that isolated DNA molecules are not products of nature
because they are not found in nature, but are “obtained in the laboratory and are
man-made, the product of human ingenuity.”343 The use of materials found in nature
is not determinative because all compositions of matter, including chemical and
biological inventions, are made from natural materials.344 The primary distinction
between products of nature and patentable compositions of matter, like the distinction
between the unpatentable mixed bacteria cultures in Funk Brothers and the
patentable, engineered bacteria in Chakrabarty, is that the patentable composition of
matter has “markedly different characteristics” from the unpatentable product of
nature.345 Isolated DNA, the Federal Circuit found, was “markedly different” from
genomic DNA due to the “distinctive chemical form” of the former compared to DNA
found in the human body, because the covalent bonds of the isolated DNA have been
severed and the isolated molecule is a “fraction of a naturally occurring DNA
molecule.”346 By contrast, “isolated DNA is a tangible, man-made composition of
matter defined and distinguished by its objectively discernible chemical structure.”347
338 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1794, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 133 S.Ct. 2107
(2013).
339 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 133 S.Ct. 2107
(2013).
340 Id. at 1333, 1336 (Moore, J., concurring-in-part), 1348 (Bryson, J., concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part).
341 Id. at 1325.
342 Id. at 1326.
343 Id. at 1325.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 1327–28. The court distinguished older cases such as American Wood-Paper and
Cochrane as having been decided on novelty, not patent subject matter eligibility, grounds. Id. at
1326 n.10.
346 Id. at 1328.
347 Id. at 1330.
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Judge Moore’s concurrence stated that Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty “do not
stake out the exact bounds of patentable subject matter.”348 “Instead, each applies a
flexible test to the specific question presented in order to determine whether the
claimed invention falls within one of the judicial exceptions to patentability.”349
Those cases teach that an invention that enlarges the range of utility compared to
the natural substance or that has “markedly different characteristics with the
potential for significant utility” constitutes patent-eligible subject matter.350 The
cases relating to purified substances, which held that purifications of, for example,
adrenaline and B-12, were patentable, whereas purifications of naturally-occurring
elements, such as uranium, were not, followed a similar inquiry—whether the
purified substance was in effect new with the potential for significant utility or had
the same inherent characteristics as the material found in nature. 351
Judge Moore held that Prometheus did not control the inquiry but “is
nonetheless instructive regarding the scope of the law of nature exception” and that
its “discussion of laws of nature (process claims) clearly ought to apply equally to
manifestations of nature (composition claims).”352 Reading Funk Brothers and
Chakrabarty together with Prometheus, she determined the following principles: “(1)
laws of nature/manifestations of nature are not patentable; [but] (2) a composition of
matter with ‘markedly different characteristics’ from that found in nature with the
potential for significant utility is directed to patentable subject matter.”353 She held
that the claimed cDNA did not exist in nature and had a distinct character and use
from the natural RNA or DNA sequences in the body and therefore was patent
eligible.354 Further, shorter length DNA sequences were likewise patentable because
the ability to use those isolated molecules as primers for a screening process or as
probes represented new and significant utility as compared to the naturallyoccurring DNA.355 Longer strands of DNA, although literally different from the gene
occurring in the chromosome, do not have an “‘enlarge[d] . . . range of . . . utility’ as
compared to nature.”356 Judge Moore refused to expand the judicial exceptions to
patentability to exclude the longer length DNA from patentable subject matter
because of “settled expectations” and extensive property rights arising from DNA
that has been patented, pursuant to PTO policy, for decades.357
Judge Bryson dissented and stated his position that isolated DNA is not patenteligible subject matter.358 He noted that Myriad was not the first to map the gene at
issue, nor did it invent a new method of nucleotide sequencing; it “applied known
sequencing techniques to identify the nucleotide order of the BRCA genes.”359 He
Id. at 1338 (Moore, J., concurring).
Id.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 1339.
352 Id. at 1339–40.
353 Id. at 1340.
354 Id. at 1340–41.
355 Id. at 1341–42.
356 Id. at 1342–43.
357 Id. at 1343–47.
358 Id. at 1349 (concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
359 Id. at 1349–50.
348
349
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believed that isolated DNA “fall[s] clearly on the ‘unpatentable’ side of the line the
[Supreme] Court drew in Chakrabarty,” because DNA exists in the body, and the only
material change made to it from its natural state is the extraction from its
environment.360 He analogized isolating DNA to extracting a mineral from the earth
or finding and propagating a newly discovered plant, which although difficult, does
not transform the mineral or plant into patent eligible subject matter. 361 Further, to
hold that the breaking of a chemical bond transforms material into a new product
would allow, for example, patents on isolated lithium (which exists only as a part of a
compound and would be isolated by breaking chemical bonds). 362
Isolated DNA is separated from the chromosomal protein at boundaries
predefined by nature that “preserve the ability of the gene to express the protein for
which it is coded.”363 The “extraction of a product in a manner that retains the
character and function of the product as found in nature does not result in the
creation of a human invention.” 364 Although stating that Prometheus did not
control the inquiry, Judge Bryson opined that “a patent involving a product of
nature should have an inventive concept that involves more than merely
incidental changes to the naturally occurring product”—it should involve an
“inventive” contribution to the product of nature and involve more than ‘“well understood, routine, conventional’ elements[.]” 365 Specifically, isolated DNA is
not patentable if the isolation of DNA is a known process, making it “the product not
of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”366
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 30, 2012 on the question
of whether human genes are patentable.367 It affirmed in part and reversed in part
the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but
that certain types of cDNA are patent eligible because they are not naturally
occurring.368 While the basis for the Supreme Court’s holding was that DNA is
naturally occurring, it also seemed to rely on the premise that isolating DNA is
routine:
DNA’s informational sequences and the processes that create mRNA,
amino acids, and proteins occur naturally within cells. Scientists can,
however, extract DNA from cells using well known laboratory
methods. These methods allow scientists to isolate specific segments

Id. at 1350.
Id.
362 Id. at 1351.
363 Id. at 1352.
364 Id. at 1353 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980)).
365 Id. at 1355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294–97 (2012)).
366 Id. (citing Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)).
367 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012).
368 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013).
360
361
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of DNA—for instance, a particular gene or part of a gene—which can
then be further studied, manipulated, or used.369
The Court also noted that cDNA is synthetic DNA created in the laboratory from
mRNA (messenger RNA).370 The Supreme Court believed that “Myriad’s patents
would, if valid, give it the exclusive right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene[] [sequences,]” mutations in which can dramatically increase the
individual’s risks of developing breast and ovarian cancer. 371
The Supreme Court, in holding that the DNA at issue was naturally occurring,
noted that Myriad “[did not] create or alter any of the genetic information” in the
genes at issue and that the “location and order of the nucleotides existed in nature
before Myriad found them.”372 Further, Myriad did “not create or alter the genetic
structure of DNA.”373 Its “principal contribution was uncovering the precise location
and genetic sequence” of the genes at issue. 374 Rather than creating a new
composition of matter, Myriad simply found an important and useful gene, “but
separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of
invention.”375 Myriad’s discovery did not render the genes a “new . . . composition[] of
matter” under § 101.376 That isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical
bonds and “creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule” did not render Myriad’s
claims patent-eligible, because the claims were not expressed “in terms of chemical
composition, nor do they rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from
the isolation of a particular section of DNA.” 377 Its claims were directed to the
information contained in the genetic sequence, not the chemical composition of a
particular molecule.378
By contrast, the Supreme Court found that creating a cDNA sequence results in
a molecule that is not naturally occurring. 379 Even though “the nucleotide sequence
of cDNA is dictated by” the original DNA sequence, a new composition of matter is
created when cDNA is made.380 cDNA is therefore “not a ‘product of nature’ and is
patent eligible under § 101.”381
The Supreme Court’s holding was limited to the patent-eligibility of DNA and
certain types of cDNA. The Court held that “genes and the information they encode
are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because they have been isolated from the
surrounding genetic material,” but did not address the patent-eligibility of methods

Id. at 2112.
Id.
371 Id. at 2113.
372 Id. at 2116.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 2117.
376 Id. (alteration in original).
377 Id. at 2118.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 2119.
380 Id.
381 Id.
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of manipulating genes or applications of knowledge about the claimed genes. 382
Limited as it was, the Supreme Court’s decision does not provide substantive
guidance on the “product of nature” exception to subject matter eligibility, nor does it
address wider issues of interest to the biochemistry or nanotechnology industries.
Arguably, Myriad did not require, at least for patent-eligibility purposes,
materials based on products found in nature to be “a new thing commercially or
therapeutically,”383 or in other words, commercially and therapeutically useful where
the natural substance was not.384 It simply required that the claimed composition
(cDNA) be different from the naturally occurring substance (DNA). 385 In that sense,
it may broaden patent protection for products based on, or inspired by, natural
materials. The Court’s holding that isolating natural materials is insufficient to
confer patent eligibility may cast doubt on the patentability of many biotechnology
and nanotechnology inventions if broadly applied to areas other than the human
genome.

V. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF PROMETHEUS AND MYRIAD ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND NANOTECHNOLOGY
Questions remain as to what effect Prometheus and Myriad will have on the
biotechnology industry. The latter decision, though narrow, calls into question
whether isolated products of nature are patentable, although it seems to permit
patenting synthetic versions of natural products (assuming all other conditions for
patentability are met).386 The effect of these cases on the biotechnology industry may
be illustrative of their effect on the nascent nanotechnology industry. Biotechnology
“involves the use of a broad range of techniques and procedures for modifying living
organisms to suit human purposes.” 387 From 1981 to 2006, approximately forty
percent of all FDA-approved pharmaceuticals were either “a biologic, natural
product, or derived from a natural product.”388 Some in the industry believe that
Prometheus will have a significant impact on biomedical research and personalized
medicine389 as expressed in the Petitioners’ brief in Myriad, others believe and note
that certain patents, particularly on genes, stifle basic research and have negative

Id. at 2120.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
384 Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1958).
385 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
386 Id. at 2111.
387 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, MAYO V. PROMETHEUS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR PATENTS, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 1 (2012).
388 Susan McBee & Bryan Jones, The Supreme Court Should Be Mindful of Naturally Derived
Products Other Than Nucleic Acids When Deciding Myriad, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:16 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/the-supreme-court-should-be-mindful-of-naturally-derivedproducts-other-than-nucleic-acids-when-deciding-myriad/.
389 THOMAS, supra note 387, at 1.
According to Thomas, “Personalized medicine involves
tailoring medical treatment to the individual characteristics of each patient, as well as classifying
individuals based on their susceptibility to a particular disease or their response to a specific
treatment.” Id. at 2.
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effects on patient treatment options by placing certain genes off limits. 390 The
biotechnology industry, however, depends on patent rights to a great extent, because
they are the most important asset for obtaining funding. 391 For example, McBee and
Jones asserted, “[F]or start-up biotechnology companies, patents covering such
products are incredibly important, ‘as they are often the most crucial asset they own
in a sector that is extremely research-intensive and with low imitation costs.’”392
Venture capital funding, one of the most important sources for biotechnology funding,
may be reduced if patent protections for biotechnology inventions are weakened. 393
Further, studies have shown that intellectual property rights have not inhibited
basic research,394 and in fact, one study reported that “the productivity gains
conferred by the licensed research tools were thought to be worth the price” by
researchers.395
Further, given that biotechnology inventions almost always start with “natural”
materials, a rule that makes it difficult to establish that something extra that
distinguishes a patentable invention from a product of nature may make patenting
such inventions much more difficult. An example from a SCOTUSblog post highlights
this difficulty:
[c]onsider, for example, Taq polymerase. The inclusion of Taq into a
process called polymerase chain reaction (PCR) has often been
credited as being the single most important technological advance to
the modern biotechnology industry. PCR uses repeated cycles of
increasing and decreasing temperatures in the presence of a
polymerase to amplify a target nucleic acid. In the original iteration
of PCR, new polymerase enzyme had to be added to the reaction
mixture after each heat cycle, because the high temperature
permanently deactivated the enzyme. Taq, however, is heat stable
and thus does not lose activity when subjected to high temperatures.
Because of this stability, Taq only needs to be added to a PCR
reaction mixture once, thus greatly reducing the costs and the time of
performing the process, and permitting easy automation. Clearly,
then, the identification and characterization of this enzyme is a
390 THOMAS, supra note 387, at 10, 13; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998)
(explaining patents on upstream technology can stifle downstream innovation by imposing
significant transaction (licensing) costs).
391 THOMAS, supra note 387, at 3.
392 McBee & Jones, supra note 388.
393 THOMAS, supra note 387, at 3.
394 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking
the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1060–61 (2008); John P. Walsh et
al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021, 1021 (2003); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES:
A
REPORT
OF
FOUR
COUNTRIES,
12,
14–15
(2007),
available
at
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPI_Four_Country_Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
395 See John P. Walsh, et al., Effect of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 301 (Wesley M. Cohen &
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
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significant technological advance, from which the public obtains a
significant benefit. Yet the properties of Taq that make it so
attractive for PCR are a consequence of its structure and function in
the natural world. Taq is naturally produced by Thermus aquaticus,
a bacterium that is naturally found in hot springs. Therefore, in
nature, just like in PCR, Taq functions as a thermostable enzyme
that catalyzes the amplification of a nucleic acid. Why should this
render Taq unpatentable?396
Some commentators have opined that Prometheus renders almost every
biotechnology patent suspect because most are based on products of nature or use
natural processes.397 Others are more concerned about the lack of guidance, given
that the criteria for what constitutes a natural process was not clearly articulated in
Prometheus,398 and such uncertainty may discourage costly research programs,
particularly in the area of diagnostics. 399 Indeed, the courts have already invalidated
other patents to diagnostic methods, including those for “screening methods to
estimate the risk of fetal Down’s syndrome,”400 and a noninvasive prenatal test using
cell-free DNA circulating in the blood of a pregnant woman.401 Of course, some
viewed the decision as within the norms of other countries, which generally prohibit
the patenting of diagnostic methods, and as beneficial to patients and basic medical
research.402
Others believe that the underpinnings of the decision are shaky in that the
concepts at issue are not natural laws. As one commentator states:
[T]he Prometheus claims involve a correlation between a nonnaturally occurring drug metabolite and the optimal dosage of a drug.
The drug metabolite does not occur naturally, but is created as a
byproduct when the human body breaks down the precursor drug.
Hence the correlation between metabolite level and optimal dosage
does not occur naturally, but only as the result of human
intervention.403
Because the correlation “at the heart of the [Prometheus] claims” is not a natural
phenomenon, determining that the claim is “patent ineligible for claiming a natural
phenomenon” is incorrect.404 Under the Supreme Court’s definition of “natural
McBee & Jones, supra note 388.
THOMAS, supra note 387, at 9.
398 Chris Holman, Mayo v. Prometheus: Analysis and Implications of an Important Supreme
Court
Decision,
HOLMAN’S
BIOTECH
IP
BLOG
(Mar.
21,
2012,
5:20
p.m.),
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/prometheus-v-mayo-analysis-and-html.
399 Id.
400 PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. App’x 65, 65, 73 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
401 Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 11-06391 SI, 2012 WL 2599340, at *11–12
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phenomena,” most life science or biotechnology patents would be based on the
discovery of such a phenomenon.405
A broad reading of the requirement that any steps beyond a concept deemed to
be a natural law must be “novel” (or not “routine” or “conventional”) could drastically
reduce the ability to obtain a patent. 406 Previous application of a similar rule (that
elucidated in Funk Brothers)407 resulted in a wave of unpatentable process
improvements, including those for (1) producing silica gel,408 (2) electrostatic
welding,409 (3) making a lead/lead oxide suspension,410 and (4) enterically coated
trypsin.411 These four process improvements were held unpatentable because they
were based on “newly discovered scientific fact[s]” coupled with other steps that did
not demonstrate invention.412 Myriad, while limiting its holding to DNA and certain
types of cDNA,
also creates significant uncertainty for other classes of naturally
occurring isolated biomolecules often critical to the biotechnology
industry, such as additional nucleotide forms (e.g., antisense, interfering
RNA), carbohydrates, lipids, and proteins (e.g., antibodies, and
specifically human antibodies). In this regard, patent claims are often
directed to isolated forms of these types of biomolecules and the court’s
decision in Myriad suggests that such claims may now need to be viewed
under a more stringent 35 U.S.C. § 101 standard.413
Because little more than a year has passed since the Prometheus decision,
and the Myriad decision is only a few months old, the effects on the industry are
difficult to measure. The reports for activity in the industry for 2012 are not yet
finalized. R&D increased in 2010 and 2011 to approximately $17.2 billion after a
drop off in 2009.414 Capital raised in the industry in 2011 was $33.4 billion, an
Id.
See Jeffrey Lefstin, Playing with Fire: What’s Really at Stake in Myriad, PATENTLY-O (Mar.
3, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/guest-post-by-dr-jeffrey-lefstin-onwhats-really-at-stake-in-myriad.html.
407 See id.
408 Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179 F.2d 793, 794 (7th Cir. 1950) (holding a
process that maintained the temperature of a wash as unpatentable).
409 In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (finding that a welding method that used a
particular frequency was unpatentable).
410 Nat’l Lead Co. v. Western Lead Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 539, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1963) (concluding
that a process in which the temperature of a reaction was controlled to yield a uniform product was
unpatentable).
411 Armour Pharm. Co. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 396 F.2d 70, 72–73 (3d Cir. 1968) (deciding
that coated trypsin was obvious, and hence unpatentable, once discovery was made that trypsin
could be absorbed by the small intestine).
412 See Lefstin, supra note 406.
413 Atulya R. Agarwal et al., Implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Myriad Decision on
Human Gene Patents and Other Biotechnology Inventions, MONDAQ (July 19, 2013),
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increase from the $25.8 billion raised in 2010.415 Those in the industry are
predicting a decrease in investment, however. For example, at a roundtable
hosted at George Washington School of Law, Phil Johnson, Chief Intellectual
Property Counsel at Johnson & Johnson, pointed out that “capital is hard to come
by these days and people are reluctant” and that safer avenues, such as R&D for
consumer products, exist for investment. 416 Further, it is unclear whether the
Supreme Court’s decision sufficiently weighed the practical effects of restricting
the ability to patent biotechnology inventions against the risks of stifling
innovation.417
The Prometheus and Myriad decisions will have serious implications for
nanotechnology as well, because “nanotechnology has been borrowing concepts and
materials from nature.”418 Nanomaterials “may be found in nature, albeit in a
different form from a commercially useful form.”419 Some nanomaterials “are[] . . . in
space or in the earth,” prompting the question: “Is one merely purifying something
found in nature?”420
Nanotechnology has risen similarly to biotechnology, with a somewhat slower
path to commercialization. In 1959, physicist Richard Feynman gave a lecture at the
American Physical Society at Caltech on December 29, 1959 entitled “There’s Plenty
of Room at the Bottom,” which contemplated the ability to manipulate matter on an
atomic scale.421 Commercialization has only recently started, however, and the
industry is considered in its “infancy.”422
The nanotechnology industry might not be as heavily dependent on venture
capital funding as biotechnology because it is heavily funded by government sources,
particularly the National Nanotechnology Initiative. 423 As such, the industry might
not be as sensitive to the ability to obtain patents as the biotechnology industry.
Private funding is beginning to increase, however. Industry estimates of private
investment in nanotechnology R&D, which comes primarily from corporations and
venture capital, are that approximately $3.5 billion was raised in the U.S., and $9.6
billion raised worldwide, in 2010.424 Nanotechnology patent applications have
increased from about 285 U.S. Patent applications per year in 2000 to 3,729 in
Id. at 39.
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418 J. Stephen Rutt, The Controversial Myriad Case and Nanotech:
Some Thoughts,
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2008.425 As of 2004, approximately 91 U.S.-based public companies and 317 U.S.based private companies were active in some aspect of nanotechnology, with 352
start-ups arising in the U.S. between 1989 and 2004.426
The same arguments regarding patentability of biotechnology products apply to
nanotechnology products. Many nanotechnology inventions rely upon the inherent
properties of the material at the nanoscale, and the question will be either: (1)
whether a sufficient “inventive concept”427 exists to show that the invention is not
claiming a law of nature; or (2) whether the material is no more than an “isolated”
naturally-occurring product.428
For example, nanotube technology would be impacted by changes to the
“product of nature” doctrine. According to one definition, “Nanotubes are cylinders
made up of a layer of carbon atoms, either a single tube (single-wall carbon
nanotubes) or multiple tubes within each other (multiwall carbon nanotubes).” 429
The discovery of nanotubes dates to approximately 1991.430 Two years after the
discovery of a carbon nanotube, IBM applied for a patent including a claim for “[a]
hollow carbon fiber having a wall consisting essentially of a single layer of carbon
atoms.”431 Although the language was broad enough to encompass a single-wall
carbon nanotube,432 such nanotubes are readily found in nature.433
As one author explains:
[M]ethods
of
producing . . . nanocompounds
might
mimic
natural[] . . . processes . . . . There are numerous patents for methods of
producing [Buckminsterfullerenes (“]buckyballs[”)], for example. Yet, as
with nanotubes, buckyballs are found in [nature, specifically] in exhaust
from vehicles, soot, and even after lightning strikes sand. The heating of a
substance to increase the presence of [buckyballs] is a fundamental
principle of chemistry and a process that occurs . . . in nature.434
If patents are granted on nanotechnology inventions that are simply laws or
products of nature, arguably they are overbroad and may stifle innovation. 435 As
425 Yan Dang et al., Trends in Worldwide Nanotechnology Patent Applications: 1991 to 2008,
12 J. NANOPARTICLE. RES. 687, 690 (2010).
426 CENTER FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE LALLY SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND
TECHNOLOGY, NANOTECHNOLOGY SECTOR REPORT 6 (2004).
427 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
428 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
429 Burger et al., supra note 18, at 245.
430 Id. (citing Sumio Iijima, Helical Microtubules of Graphitic Carbon, 354 NATURE 56, 56–58
(Nov. 7, 1991)).
431 Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,424,054 cl. 3 (filed May 31, 1993)).
432 Id. (citing C.J. MILLER ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 70 (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 2004)).
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with biotechnology, however, these concerns may be more theoretical than actual,
and there is no doubt that the development of nanotechnology and its applications
are beneficial.
Graphene, a two-dimensional material, has recently become a focus of scientific
research and development.436 The 2010 Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded to two
University of Manchester Scientists, Andre Geim and Konstantin Novoselov, for
ground-breaking experiments regarding graphene.437 Pham and Fayerberg defined
grapheme as a “flat monolayer of carbon atoms tightly packed into a two-dimensional
(2D) honeycomb lattice, and . . . a basic building block for graphitic materials of all
other dimensionalities.”438 Although graphene has been known for many years, 439
Geim and Novoselov were the first to isolate it by “micromechanical cleavage,”
also known colloquially as the “Scotch Tape technique.”440 Graphene patent
applications numbered 110 in 2009, 224 in 2010, and approximately 336 for 2011,
“a 50% increase over 2010 and a[] . . . 200% increase over 2009.”441
The
excitement surrounding graphene, however, has much to do with its “natural”
properties such as thermal conductivity and strength.442 If graphene’s amazing
properties are seen to be solely due to its natural properties, or if graphene is seen as
existing in nature, with only the need to be isolated, how will the ability to obtain
patents on its various applications and other two-dimensional materials be affected?
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Prometheus, which addresses the patentability
of so-called “natural laws,” and Myriad, which addresses the “product of nature”
exception to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, may have a significant effect
on the biotechnology and nanotechnology industries. Given that both industries
depend on building blocks of nature and/or the “natural” properties of materials,
broadly construing the product of nature exception to subject matter eligibility may
curtail the ability to obtain patents in those fields. While patent protection should
not be so broad as to stifle innovation, if it is difficult to obtain or enforce patents,
funding for further applications in those industries may become limited, slowing
future advances. The federal courts should carefully consider those risks in applying
Prometheus and Myriad.
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